Thirty-one theses on dating capitalism
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PART FOUR — THE OTHER LEDGER
I
Revenue up, payers down
II
Success ends subscriptions
III
Manufactured scarcity
IV
One owner, many brands
Hidden ranking, patented swipe
VI
Volume produces refusal
VII
The app is the destination
VIII
Demographic pricing
IX
Fabricated interest
X
Safety became an upgrade
XI
Intentionality drives growth
XII
Queer platforms consolidated
XIII
Contraction intensifies extraction
XIV
Free users are inventory
XV
Global risk, concentrated revenue
XVI
Health data as telemetry
XVII
Data as national security
XVIII
Membership reveals identity
XIX
Identification without breach
XX
Profiles sold as commodities
XXI
The platform remembers more
XXII
Community versus its workers
XXIII
Extraction is optional
XXIV
Refusal is not innocence
XXV
The grid is optional
XXVI
Filtering is not sorting
XXVII
The applications work
XXVIII
Lifeline and trap
XXIX
Loneliness is the market
XXX
Companionship without reciprocity
XXXI
Named, not stopped
THESIS XXVIII
PART FOUR — THE OTHER LEDGER
The same infrastructure is the lifeline and the trap.
The same app can enable connection, entrapment and emergency warning.
Human Rights Watch documented in a 135-page report how security forces in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia create fake profiles to entrap users, producing prosecution, torture and extortion; a twenty-seven-year-old Egyptian man recounted recognising, in the police report, that the man he had met on Grindr was one of the officers. After the rainbow flag was raised at a Cairo concert in September 2017, more than seventy people were arrested, many through app entrapment. In March 2023, following reports of thirty-five to forty further arrests, Grindr pushed hourly warnings to every user in Egypt and worked with local advocacy groups, as it has through Grindr for Equality since 2015. The company that leaked HIV status is also the company that sends the warning, and both statements are true at once.
EVIDENCE SNAPSHOT
5
COUNTRIES
Countries covered by the Human Rights Watch investigation
70+
EGYPT ARRESTS
People arrested after the 2017 Cairo concert
35–40
2023 ARRESTS
Further arrests reported during 2023
Hourly
WARNINGS
Safety alerts sent to Grindr users in Egypt
KEY FINDING
Human Rights Watch documented in a 135-page report how security forces in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia create fake profiles to entrap users, producing prosecution, torture and extortion; a twenty-seven-year-old Egyptian man recounted recognising, in the police report, that the man he had met on Grindr was one of the officers.
IMPLICATION
The same infrastructure can be indispensable and dangerous at once.
Source apparatus
SOURCE 01
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HUMAN-RIGHTS REPORT
Human Rights Watch. (2023). "All this terror because of a photo": Digital targeting and its offline consequences for LGBT people in the Middle East and North Africa.
SOURCE 02
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HUMAN-RIGHTS REPORT
ARTICLE 19. (2018). Apps, arrests and abuse in Egypt, Lebanon and Iran.